The Age 60 Rule: Age Discrimination in Commercial Aviation

Robin Wilkening: rmwilkeningearthlink.net

The Federal Aviation Administration, along with the Air Line Pilots Association and the politicians whose pockets they line, state that the Age 60 Rule is a necessary safety standard. The truth is, if the issue was really safety there wouldn’t be an Age 60 Rule. Time and again over-60 pilots have been shown to be as safe as or safer than their younger colleagues. The Age 60 Rule has never really been about safety.

The Age 60 Rule’s conception followed the unethical professional coupling of the CEO of American Airlines, C. R. Smith, and the first Administrator of the FAA, retired Lieutenant General Elwood Quesada, resulting in an economic windfall for the airline and a sweet post-retirement job for the Administrator.16, 17, 18, 19 Even then the FAA knew "it was not yet possible to establish a retirement age for civil airline pilots based on scientifically determined facts."1

A brief review of the three major concerns frequently raised regarding the health and fitness of our most experienced and skilled pilots is in order.

    1. Pilots over age 60 might experience incapacitation.
    2. Pilots over age 60 might experience undetected cognitive decline.
    3. Medical testing may not identify pilots over age 60 who might be at risk for adverse health events.

Incapacitation

Sudden incapacitation due to cardiovascular disease was the stated reason, though not the real reason, that the actual age of 60 was chosen. Forty years ago, when ALPA still championed the rights of all pilots to remain employed, former ALPA president Clarence Sayen challenged FAA Administrator Elwood Quesada to justify his hasty decision to enact the Rule. Quesada responded with 41 highly questionable articles culled from the medical archives of the 1950’s, the majority of these having been published decades earlier. In addition to being astonishingly outdated, these articles described characteristics of the general population and not of airline pilots.20 They are clearly not the "fundamental, indisputable principles of medical science"30 that current ALPA president, Duane Woerth, has stated. The original justification for the Rule implied, incorrectly, that the health characteristics of the general population of white males in the United States applied also to the population of air carrier pilots. Wrong then and wrong now! Airline pilots are still healthier and live longer than their counterparts in the general population the world over.3, 4, 7, 12, 13, 14, 22

Moreover, concern over pilot incapacitation causing a crash is simply unjustified. IATA data and simulator data show that the risk of incapacitation due to cardiovascular disease is only 1 event in more than 20 million flight hours. The calculated probability of a crash occurring as a result of incapacitation is 1 event in every 8.3 billion flight hours, or, stated another way, 1 episode every 400 years.8 Furthermore, it is well established that in-flight incapacitation is a far lesser threat to safety than are mishaps due to inexperienced pilot error.11

The truth is, 40 years of medical scrutiny show no justification for the Age 60 Rule based on the fear that an airline pilot will become incapacitated, regardless of age.

Cognitive Performance

The normal, healthy aging process is accompanied by decreases in cognitive function over time in all population groups, though rarely manifest prior to 70.25, 26 Airline pilots consistently demonstrate superior task performance when compared to age-matched non-pilots.27 High levels of education and training — characteristics of commercial aviators — significantly enhance the retention of mental abilities.25 Airline pilots are selected for good health at the start of their careers and are subjected to comprehensive medical examinations every 6 months thereafter. Illnesses that might lead to cognitive decline are detected and corrected, or the pilot is removed from the work force.9 They are the most monitored and health-conscious of all professionals. Moreover, all airline pilots undergo mandatory simulator time that tests every conceivable routine and emergent situation. They are under the constant scrutiny of other pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, loadmasters, gate personnel and air traffic controllers during daily flight operations. They are subject to the two-communication rule at all times. There is simply no chance that cognitive decline will occur unnoticed. The truth is, 40 years of medical scrutiny show no justification for the Age 60 Rule based on the fear that an airline pilot will have undetected cognitive impairment, regardless of age.

Identification of Pilots at Risk for Adverse Health Events

ALPA opines that "medical science has not developed a regimen of reliable tests that can be administered effectively to identify those aging pilots who are, or will become, incapacitated, or whose performance will decline to an unacceptable level."30 ALPA's president, Duane Woerth, who made this pronoucement, is either sadly uninformed, or seeks deliberately to misinform. The truth is, sophisticated and readily available testing programs have been used by the FAA for more than 20 years to determine airline pilot fitness for duty. In addition to the diagnostic value of these ever-improving tests, they are widely accepted to have predictive value as well.2, 6, 21 Moreover, age simply does not affect the manner in which disease manifests itself diagnostically.28 The claim that these tests - both medical and psychological - fail the day a pilot turns 60 is simply wrong! Airline pilots under age 60 who have been removed from duty for myocardial infarction, coronary artery bypass surgery, valvular disease, alcoholism (even after relapse), drug abuse, brain injury, psychiatric illnesses, and a long list of other life-threatening maladies, are routinely returned to flying upon passing one or more diagnostic tests, and have been for decades.10, 22, 29 They are allowed to prove themselves fit. Without exception or justification, the FAA denies access to these same tests by pilots the day they turn 60. This unethical double standard in medical evaluations based on age alone is not defensible! The truth is, it's not a safety standard - it's age discrimination.

Flight Performance Data: the Greatest Significance to Public Safety

Most importantly, decades of actual flight performance data, the measure of greatest significance to public safety, show that for every age group, older pilots are as safe as younger. The FAA's 1993 Hilton Study demonstrated that there was simply no diminution in flight performance as pilots reached age 60,15 a finding confirmed by 1999 FAA data showing no difference in accident risk comparing pilots aged 20-59.5 FAA data analyzed independently and published in the Chicago Tribune in 1999 showed that air transport pilots over age 60 were as safe as their younger colleagues.24 In attempting to counter the Tribune's findings the FAA deliberately manipulated the data to exclude these over-60 pilots from their analysis. However, FAA data from 1988-1997 released last year confirms yet again that air transport pilots with Class 1 medical certificates - the type of pilot who can be an airline Captain - are as safe as younger pilots.31 How many times does this information need to be repeated before it's believed?

The increasingly traveled skies of our nation require the most experienced pilots in the cockpit, those that are now forced out of work by the Age 60 Rule. The FAA clings irrationally to the notion that the age of 60 is an appropriate single standard for the evaluation of older pilot fitness, and promotes their incorrect and outmoded position by misrepresentation of data. The archaic and discriminatory Age 60 Rule prohibits our most experienced pilots from performing the work they know and do better than anyone else in the business, thereby compromising the safety of all air travelers.

  1. ALPA v. Elwood R. Quesada, 182 F. Supp. 595 (S.D., N.Y., 1960).
  2. Baker KH. Neuropsychological Testing of Pilots. Flight Safety Foundation 1991;36th CASS (White Plains):1-14.
  3. Band PR, Le ND, Deschamps M, Coldman AJ, Gallagher RP, Moody J. Cohort Study of Air Canada Pilots: Mortality, Cancer Incidence, and Leukemia Risk. Am J Epidemiol 1996;143(2):137-143.
  4. Besco RO, Sangal SA, Nesthus TE. A Longevity and Survival Analysis for a Cohort of Retired Airline Pilots. DOT/FAA/AM-95-5. Office of Aviation Medicine, Washington DC 20591.
  5. Broach D. Pilot Age and Accident Rates: A Re-analysis of the 1999 Chicago Tribune Report and Discussion of Technical Considerations for Future Analyses. FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute AAM-00-A-HRR-520.
  6. Bruce RA, Fisher LD. Exercise-Enhanced Risk Factors for Coronary Heart Disease vs. Age as Criteria for Mandatory Retirement of Health Pilots. Aviat Space Environ Med 1987;58:792-798.
  7. Castelo-Branco A, Cabral-Sa A, Coelho Borges J. Comparative Study of Physical and Mental Incapacities Among Portuguese Airline Pilots Under and Over Age 60. Aviat Space Environ Med 1985;56:754-7.
  8. Chapman PJC. The Consequences of In-Flight Incapacitation in Civil Aviation. Aviat Space Environ Med 1984; 55:497-500.
  9. Dark SJ. Characteristics of Medically Disqualified Airmen Applicants in Calendar Years 1973 and 1974. FAA Office of Aviation Medicine AM-76-10. (See also FAA Office of Aviation Medicine AM-78-25, AM-80-19, AM-83-5, AM-85-9, AM86-7, AM-90-5).
  10. FAA Aeromedical Certification System, First Class Airmen (1999) Under 60 Years Old, pp.1-74.
  11. Froom P, Benbassat J, Gross M, Ribak J, Lewis B. Air Accidents, Pilot Experience, and Disease-Related Inflight Sudden Incapacitation. Aviat Space Environ Med 1988;59:278-81.
  12. House Report 2080. Better Management Needed of Medical Research on Aging. 89th Congress, 26th Session. September 26, 1966, p. 19.
  13. Irvine D, Davies M. The Mortality of British Airways Pilots, 1966-1989: A Proportional Mortality Study. Aviat Space Environ Med 1992; 63:276-9.
  14. Kaji M, Tango T, Asukata I, Tajima N, Yamamoto K, Yamamoto Y, Hokari M. Mortality Experience of Cockpit Crewmembers from Japan Airlines. Aviat Space Environ Med 1993;64:748-50.
  15. Kay EJ, Hillman DJ, Hyland DT, Voros RS. Age 60 Study: Consolidated Database Experiments Final Report 1994. DOT/FAA/AM-94/22. Office of Aviation Medicine, Washington DC 20591.
  16. Letter from C. R. Smith to General Elwood Quesada, February 5, 1959. From the personal files of former Federal Air Surgeon Homer L. Reighard, MD. These files became public information during a civil suit under the Freedom of Information Act, Civil Action Number 85-1943 (D.C., D.C., 1985).
  17. Letter from C. R. Smith to Clarence N. Sayen, April 3, 1959. From Reighard files.
  18. Letter from Clarence N. Sayen to C. R. Smith, April 14, 1959. From Reighard files.
  19. Letter from C. R. Smith to General Elwood Quesada, 30 April 1959. From Reighard files.
  20. Letter from Elwood R. Quesada to Clarence N. Sayen, August 5, 1959. From Reighard files.
  21. Mapou RL, Kay GG, Rundell JR, Temoshok L. Measuring Performance Decrements in Aviation Personnel Infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus. Aviat Space Environ Med 1993; 64:158-64.
  22. Mohler SR. Aircrew Physical Status and Career Longevity. Hum Factors Bull 1984; 31(1):1-8.
  23. Salisbury DA, Band PR, Threlfall WJ, Gallagher RP. Mortality Among British Columbia Pilots. Aviat Space Environ Med 1991; 62:3351-2.
  24. Schmeltzer J. FAA data find older hands are steadier. Chicago Tribune Sunday July 11, 1999.
  25. Shock NW, Greulich RC, Adrus R, Arenberg D, Costa, Jr. PT, Lakatta EG, Tobin JD. Normal Human Aging: The Baltimore Longitudinal Study of Aging. NIH Publication Number 84-2450 November 1984.
  26. Stuck AE, van Gorp WG, Josephson KR, Morgenstern H, Beck JC. Multidimensional Risk Assessment versus Age as Criterion for Retirement of Airline Pilots. J Am Geriatr Soc 1992;40:526-532.
  27. Tsang PS, Shaner TL. Age, Attention, Expertise, and Time-Sharing Performance. Psychol Aging 1998; 13(2):323-47.
  28. Veroff AE. The Neuropsychology of Aging. Psychol Res 1980;41:259-68.
  29. Weiner E. Doctor’s Orders. Flying 1986; July:82-84.
  30. Woerth D. Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Aviation on Pilot Shortages and the Effects on Rural Air Service, July 25, 2000.
  31. Broach D, Joseph KM, Schroeder DJ. An Analysis of Professional Air Transport Pilot Accident Rates by Age. AAM-00-A-HRR-520.